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RADICAL RESISTERS

David B. Lyons
Editor's note: This articleisfrom anaddress to the Pacific
division of the American PhilosophicalAssociation on
April2.
In the early 1840s Henry David Thoreau stopped
paying the Massachusetts pol tax. When pressed for
payment in 1846, he invited arrest and went to jail.'
He had wanted to protest his state's complicity in
the federal government's support of chattel slavery
and its policies toward Native Americans. By the
time he delivered his lecture on civil disobedience,
in 1848, events had produced another cause. Thoreau
also condemned this country's expansionist war
against Mexico.
Thoreau's writing influenced Mohandas
Gandhi, who in turn inspired Martin Luther King Jr.
Those three are widely acknowledged as paradigm
practitioners of civil disobedience. That fact creates
a problem for the theory of civil disobedience. The
prevailing theory holds that resistance qualifies as
civil disobedience only if it is public nonviolent
protest performed conscientiously by someone who
accepts the legitimacy of the existing political system
and is willing to suffer the legal consequences.2 Each
provision of the theory can reasonably be challenged.
I shall focus on the requirement that one who engages
in civil disobedience accepts the political system's
legitimacy. That issue has been neglected, and it
seems politically important.
What is it to accept the legitimacy of one's
political system? The terms suggest that the resister
respects the system as a whole and thus acknowledges
a duty to obey all its laws, including those the resister
condemns as unjust.3 The resister adopts unlawful
measures only because the system contains a grave
defect that resists repair by lawful means. Because of
the duty to obey, the resister faces a moral dilemma
when contemplating unlawful protest. The resister's
willing acceptance of the legal sanctions expresses
respect for the system and acknowledges the duty to
Opposite: Henry David Thoreau, 1861; right:
Thoreau's possessions from his cabin at Walden
Pond

obey. In short, the civilly disobedient resister is a
reformer, not a radical or a revolutionary.
That picture fails to fit Thoreau, Gandhi, and
King. None expressed the required respect for law.
None indicated acceptance of a general duty to obey
the law. Each had radical aims.
Thoreau embraced philosophical anarchism.
He regarded laws as tolerable only if they did not
require one to become an "agent of injustice."4 Even
before the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (which required
all to aid slave catchers), Thoreau saw the government's promotion of slavery as violating that limit.
We might think of discounting Thoreau's political statements because he calls for "revolution"5
but ignores the need for organization to achieve
change,6 and he suggests that one need only "wash
one's hands" of the government's crimes by refusing
to pay taxes.' On closer inspection one finds, however, that Thoreau's resistance was not limited to
tax refusal. He helped many escaped slaves make
their way to freedom. Appalled by his state's enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, he applauded
efforts to free by force those taken as fugitives. He
supported John Brown's violent antislavery campaign in Kansas, and-while other abolitionists tried
to regain their composure after the raid on Harper's
Ferry-he spoke out strongly in praise of Brown.5
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So Thoreau's radical perspective cannot simply
be discounted. But Thoreau was an atypical resister:
he was not a target of the unjust laws and policies he
protested, and he resisted on his own. Gandhi and
King are more typical in both respects.
Gandhi is a crystal-clear counterexample to the
prevailing theory. He rejected the existing political
system, including British sovereignty over India,
which is why he led campaigns for India's independence. The Indian National Congress became a
major force as a result of those campaigns, but he
participated in Congress only in connection with
them. He had little regard for political parties and
parliaments. He believed in dealing with social injustice by means of what he called satyagrahaconfronting issues first through discussion and then
nonviolently defying custom or law as necessary.
Gandhi's aims were more radical than those of
the colonial rebels of 1776: not only full political
independence from European colonizers9 but also
economic self-sufficiency, political decentralization
to the village level, drastic reform of the caste system, and the development of labor-intensive industry to provide employment and dignity for ordinary
Indians.
King's resistance may seem to accord better
with prevailing theory. The campaigns that he led
or supported had reformist objectives, such as easing
discrimination in public facilities. He could wholeheartedly appeal to constitutional principles, democratic ideals, and egalitarian values, which were
officially endorsed at the time. He claimed that his
resistance expressed "the highest respect for law."1
But King's talk of respect for law was misleading. He embraced Aquinas's view that just laws are
morally binding but unjust laws merely coerce. He
acknowledged that there can be good grounds for
respecting a system with flaws but reasoned that a
system disfranchising some of its citizens lacks a
moral basis for asking them to respect the laws that
discriminate against them.
The Montgomery bus boycott presented modest demands: courtesy by drivers toward African
American passengers, the hiring of African American drivers, and a less discriminatory manner of
applying the Jim Crow law."1 It was prudent to adopt
limited objectives, which might be achieved at a
reasonable cost. But everyone saw the desegregation
of Montgomery buses as merely a step toward the
goal of equal rights for African Americans.

That is why those modest demands evoked
violent reactions. Homes of boycott leaders were
bombed. Shotguns were fired into King's home and
into an integrated bus. Four African American
churches were bombed. Those actions were understandable, as similar challenges to white supremacy
were developing throughout the South. The entire
system of white supremacy was at risk.
The unlawful violence was supported by local
officials, who themselves participated in terror, rape,
and lynching. The federal government refused to
take timely measures against the violence, which
was a pervasive, long-standing feature of the system,
not in theory but in practice. It would be unreasonable for the targets of terror to regard the system as
legitimate.
King also became more radical with experience. Like many other organizers, King expanded
his aims beyond civil rights for African Americans.
He recognized the interracial scope and terrible
significance of poverty, and he saw that the problem
could not be addressed by modest measures. He
questioned "the basic system of social and economic
control" and spoke of the "need for a radical restructuring of the architecture of American society." He
rejected "traditional capitalism" and embraced programs that he recognized would face "fierce opposition." It is clear that his talk from early on of the
need for "revolution"'3 acquired more expansive
meaning throughout his political career.
What accounts for these clashes between the
prevailing theory of civil disobedience and the orientation of its practitioners? The theorists addressed
issues raised by the civil rights movement of the
1950s, which emerged in a period of severe political
repression. While officials persecuted dissenters who
acted within the law, civil rights activists not only
challenged established authority but sometimes broke
the law. Even worse in the eyes of those in power,
most of the activists were African Americans, who
were expected to know their place. Critics of civil
disobedience argued that unlawful conduct could
not be justified in our society, and they offered
arguments for conformity.
In those circumstances the most pressing issue
for theorists who were sympathetic to civil disobedience was its justifiability. They recognized that a
duty to obey the law did not settle the issue of
obedience, because duties are rarely absolute. When
law supports an unjust practice, a duty to obey might

Martin Luther King Jr., 1966

be outweighed by the duty to oppose injustice. Justifiable disobedience could not be ruled out a priori.
The theorists' focus on the justifiability of civil
disobedience was not, however, a mere tactical maneuver. Most sympathetic theorists agreed with the
critics that the burden of justification falls on the
one who disobeys the law. That amounts to the idea
that there is a duty to obey the law. But they also saw
that civil rights activists identified grave deficiencies
that the system appeared incapable of addressing
adequately through lawful procedures. 4 Because the
theorists believed that disobedience could be justified in some cases, they argued that a just system
allows for some unlawful acts that aim at reform.
The point of the theory was to identify those acts.
Within the framework of contemporary political philosophy, to assume that there is a duty to obey
the law is to regard the system as basically just, not
requiring radical transformation. In that respect the
theorists accepted the legitimacy of the system. At
the same time, they respected such individuals as
Thoreau, Gandhi, and King. They appear to have
assumed that those individuals shared their political
orientation. Thus sympathetic theorists projected
their own less radical perspective onto the civil
disobeyers they respected.
At any rate, the prevailing theory of civil disobedience assumes an improbable set of conditions:
on the one hand, that civil disobedience requires
substantial justification because the system is suffi-

ciently just to support a duty to obey the law; on the
other hand, that civil disobedience can be justified
when lawful political action cannot rectify a grave
moral problem in the system. But a basically just,
well-functioning democracy would not long tolerate serious pockets of injustice. If a system contains
such entrenched flaws, then it must systematically
disadvantage politically weak segments of the community, in which case the democracy does not function well. Furthermore, plausible conceptions of
social justice and political democracy would not
imply that those who lack a fair share of political
power and are the targets of entrenched injustice are
morally bound to obey all the laws, including laws
that support their systematic victimization.
The combination of conditions presupposed by
prevailing theory seems impossible. For reasons such
as those, the radical political orientation of the
paradigm practitioners of civil disobedience seems
to have been both reasonable and warranted.
1. Thoreau was jailed just one night, because someone
paid his tax.
2. P. Harris, Civil Disobedience 2 (1989).
3. There are often various good reasons to comply with
law. The only one at issue here applies to all people in the
community and all its laws and requires conformity even
when laws are unjust-on the ground, e.g., that even
those laws are products of democratic institutions.
4. H. D,Thoreau, Reform Papers73 (1973).
5. Id., at 67.
6. He distrusted all organizations, including voluntary
groups dedicated to reform, such as antislavery societies.
7. Thoreau, supra note 4, at 71.
8. It is arguable that Thoreau understood better than
many others the difference between a madman and a
committed revolutionary.
9. The position of the Indians relative to Britain was
comparable not to that of the British colonists but to that
of the Native Americans,
10. M. L. King Jr., Why We Can't Wait 84 (1964).
11. Drivers would require African Americans to give up
seats so that whites could sit down and would insist that
there be empty seats between the two groups. Neither
arrangement was clearly required by the segregation law.
12. M. L. King Jr., Where Do We Go from Here? 17,133,
186,163 (1968).
13. King, supra note 10, at 15.
14. That is,reliance on such procedures would not eliminate the injustice or would impose excessive costs on its
victims.
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